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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of history, governments have applied import protection through many different policy instruments. One extreme features an instrument that is widespread, simple, and relatively transparent: most customs authorities currently apply a nondiscriminatory, ad valorem import tariff. Heading toward the other extreme are dozens if not hundreds of eclectic examples of instruments that are more complex, less transparent, and which frequently entail additional political-economic distortions. Consider the experience of only one industry in only one country -U.S. steel -even since the 1960s. While being protected by applied, nondiscriminatory, ad valorem import tariffs, U.S. steel has also featured quotas, minimum price arrangements, voluntary export restraints, antidumping, countervailing duties, suspension agreements, preferential tariffs to NAFTA and other partners, import licenses and monitoring, safeguards, expanded trade adjustment assistance, and local content requirements.
That import protection arises through such a number of different instruments raises fundamental questions for political-economic research. Are there apparent trends in the use and non-use of particular import protection instruments? Furthermore, what are the political-economic and institutional determinants of, interrelationships between, and implications for, government use of these different instruments?
The next section begins by examining historical trends for a number of import protection instruments. Perhaps the most pervasive trend across the international trading system since 1947 has been the reduction in applied tariffs and opening of economies to international commerce. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling The New York Times analogy that Robert E. Baldwin made famous at the conclusion of the Kennedy Round through its inclusion in his comprehensive economic analyses of nontariff protection, " [t] he lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away" (1970, 2) .
While individual nations may have drained their swamps by lowering applied tariffs, the more complete story of import protection admits to substantial heterogeneity. Sometimes these low applied tariffs have not been accompanied by the legal commitments that 'bind' them under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Sometimes the low applied tariffs are not offered to all trading partners but are instead offered only on a discriminatory basis through regional, bilateral, or preferential regimes.
Sometimes a low applied tariff on a particular product is then more than offset by application of a new and higher tax through antidumping, safeguards, or countervailing duties. Sometimes even more innovative, non-transparent, and complex nontariff barriers have fallen into use.
These trends suggest complexities between tariff and nontariff protection that push beyond even Baldwin's substantial foresight of the 1960s. Draining the swamp of tariff protection may have done more than just reveal the existence of previously unobserved nontariff protection. It may have stimulated growth in levels of old and new forms of nontariff protection. It may have also resulted in an altered political-economic ecosystem in which governments conduct trade policy.
Section 3 reviews some of the theories that guide the literature on import protection as well as the implications for the relationship between tariff and nontariff protection. These theories draw from both economic efficiency and redistributive motives for trade policy; many are also informed by the evolution of the multilateral trading system from the start-up of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through the WTO period that began in 1995.
The fourth section turns to major areas of empirical study in light of this theory. Econometric research has begun to shed new insight into the determinants of government application of import tariffs, as well as the forces that influence their negotiated reduction under international trade agreements. An emerging literature also explores empirically how trade agreement commitments, as well as politicaleconomic shocks and incentives, jointly affect government resort to other instruments of import protection. 
INSTITUTIONS AND TRENDS IN POLICY INSTRUMENTS
This section describes key institutional developments and trends in use of tariff and nontariff instruments of import protection since the 1940s.
Institutional influences under the GATT/WTO system
Before the advent of the multilateral trading system in its current form, tariff and nontariff barriers were very high. to impose higher duties in response to certain economic shocks, provided they went through particular 1 Important treatments of the evolution of the trading system under the GATT and WTO include Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) as well as Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg (2006) . Furthermore, Dam (1970 ), Hudec (1990 ), and Jackson (1997 European Union continued to have periods in which a significant share of their imports were covered by such import restrictions, comparable and sometimes higher levels of import coverage under these nontariff instruments arose, seemingly out of nowhere, for countries like Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Most emerging economies had virtually no experience using these particular instruments before each underwent its own major episode of tariff liberalization in the late 1980s or 1990s.
Voluntary export restraints (VERs) are a second nontariff instrument that experienced a period of proliferation; most of this occurred prior to the more recent turn to temporary trade barriers. VERs work like an import quota but with one important twist: because the exporters voluntarily agree to restrict their quantities of foreign sales, the exporting country gets the 'rents' associated with the consumer price increase above its free trade level. While the economic outcome for exporters is typically not as good as free trade, it is frequently better than under a comparably trade-restricting import tariff or import quota.
At least two related factors took hold in the 1960s that contributed to the proliferation of VERs.
The first factor was Japan's GATT entry in 1955 and the integration of its export-led growth model into the trading system. Increased Japanese exports of textiles and related products put adjustment pressure on import-competing industries across many countries, including a number of industrialized economies.
Between Japan's GATT accession in 1955 and 1970, roughly 50 GATT Contracting Parties invoked their 8
Article XXXV rights not to apply MFN tariffs to Japan's exports; many imposed country-specific quotas.
The United States, on the other hand, sought to negotiate VERs with Japan. The second factor was pragmatism. In an environment in which governments were committed to imposing some new import protection, VERs were more palatable to exporters than import quotas or tariffs; for with a VER the exporter at least received the rents associated with the trade restriction. A third important trend is that applied import tariffs for a number of countries have also fallen preferentially, through two main instruments, for a number of countries since 1947. 6 The first are 4 Baldwin (1970, 30-46 ) also highlights the frequency with which quotas were used during this period in areas unrelated to Japan's GATT entry. While many of the quotas that had been imposed as Article XXII (balance of payments) exceptions after the Second World War were phased out by the mid-1960s, industrial economy quotas continued to affect coal, petroleum, and agricultural products. Furthermore, Baldwin finds that 40 industries were covered by quota bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in the fall of 1968 alone. To summarize, the major inter-temporal movements in the rates of import protection under these different policy instruments -e.g., applied MFN tariffs, preferential tariffs, VERs, antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties -suggest common political-economic determinants. The remainder of this paper highlights formal research examining these questions.
THEORETICAL STUDIES
Before turning to the determinants of import protection instruments, an examination of two more fundamental questions is in order. First, why do governments impose import-restricting policies at all?
Second, why do governments voluntarily commit to limit their access to certain import-restricting policy instruments by signing trade agreements? Once informed by frameworks that address these questions, this section then turns to the implications of these trade agreement commitments (covering tariffs) for government use of other instruments of import protection.
Theories of import restrictions: Tariffs and everything else
Research has coalesced around two main government motives to explain policies that interfere with free trade. The first motive is economic efficiency. If the country is 'large' -so that a shift to its consumption or supply of a product leads to changes in world (or the foreign exporter's received) prices -the government can use trade policy to shift the terms of trade in its country's favor and improve national wellbeing relative to free trade (Johnson, 1953-54) .
The second motive is redistributive. Even if the country is 'small' -so that changes to its trade policy do not affect world prices, thus ruling out the terms-of-trade motive by assumption -governments may want to impose a 'politically optimal' import tariff if its benefits are greater than the costs. The economic costs of protection are well known; they include the deadweight losses associated with too little domestic consumption and too much induced production by relatively inefficient domestic industries.
However, in political-economy models of import protection, political benefits can overcome such costs.
For example, in the Grossman and Helpman (1994) workhorse, political-economy model of lobbying for protection, the benefits arising from tariffs can outweigh their efficiency costs if governments value campaign contributions in addition to the economic wellbeing of producers and consumers.
A longstanding literature has evolved that compares the political-economic implications of different instruments of import-protection. Import tariffs are generally inefficient for small countries relative to free trade; furthermore, import tariffs are inefficient relative to outcomes whereby governments use domestic policy instruments (taxes, subsidies) to address particular market failures in ways that do not create by-product distortions. 7 Nevertheless, conditional on an outcome whereby a government is committed to imposing some form of import protection, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tariff is typically the least inefficient instrument. 8 To provide one illustrative example, consider a nontariff alternative such as a quantitative restriction, an instrument that theoretically can be structured so as to be exactly as tradedistorting as an import tax. Because quotas also require the government to undertake a separate and discretionary decision for how to allocate the licenses, additional opportunities for wasteful rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) can arise in addition to the potential for discrimination between foreign sources.
Large countries, import protection, and trade agreements
Why do large countries sign trade agreements, and what are the implications? To begin, consider a world without trade agreements in which rational governments thus set optimal (Nash) import tariffs so as to maximize their country's economic wellbeing.
One strain of the literature suggests governments of large countries find trade agreements efficiency-improving if the agreement helps coordinate their and another large country's trade policies so as to avoid a prisoner's dilemma outcome Staiger 1999, 2002) . For import tariffs, the trade agreement is needed because neither country has an incentive to lower its tariff unilaterally; a unilateral reduction for a large country starting from its optimal tariff would lead to an increase in the world price of its imported good, which would make it worse off. Interestingly, the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity can be interpreted as facilitating a negotiated outcome whereby one country trades off a reduction to its import tariffs (affecting a foreign trading partner's exports) against a reduction to the foreign country This approach reveals that governments may need to increase their equilibrium levels of import protection in order to maintain cooperation in response to import surges, because those surges create a new and strong incentive for the government to defect by raising its tariff because it would improve its nation's 12 economic wellbeing. However, an implication for countries that have taken on commitments to lower and bind their applied MFN tariffs at the WTO is that the government may need to switch to some other policy instrument to increase protection if it hopes to remain consistent with its basic WTO obligations.
To summarize, large countries have a unilateral incentive to impose beggar-thy-neighbor import protection policies that improve their economic wellbeing by shifting some of the protection's costs onto trading partners. Trade agreements can thus be used to help two or more such large countries coordinate the import tariff reductions that each would not undertake unilaterally. Nevertheless, trade agreements that constrain national use of tariffs come with their own caveats. In particular, a cooperative trade agreement on tariff commitments may be unsustainable in an environment characterized by trade flow volatility if the agreement does not provide governments with the flexibility to sometimes access additional import protection. Take the classic Grossman and Helpman (1994) political-economy model of a small country.
Here the government would not want to sign a trade agreement that would tie its hands and constrain its tariffs because this would foreclose its ability to extract rents from domestic producers through their lobbying activities and campaign contributions. However, Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) relax the model's assumption on capital immobility and allow factors to be mobile across sectors in the long-run in order to show that the expectation of import protection can lead unproductive industries to make 9 Rosendorff and Milner (2001) provide a related approach that abstracts from a number of the economic market issues and predictions highlighted in Bagwell and Staiger (1990) .
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excessive investment that even a politically motivated government would prefer to avoid. A trade agreement that commits the government to impose lower tariffs in the long run can therefore help prevent excessive lobbying for import protection.
10
There are, however, potential costs for politically-motivated governments that seek to sign trade agreements to constrain their use of tariffs, especially when other instruments of protection are available. Copeland (1990) , for example, develops a two-staged game in which governments can first negotiate cooperatively over tariffs and then implement nontariff protection non-cooperatively in the second stage.
If governments are politically-motivated and place a high value on the interests of producers, trade agreements that eliminate tariffs can lead governments to substitute policy toward more economically costly forms of nontariff protection in the second stage so that consumers are made worse off.
Overall, this literature identifies a number of tradeoffs associated with trade agreements, even for small countries. Politically-motivated governments may use trade agreements as a commitment device to help prevent their own excessive application of import tariffs. However, trade agreements with loopholes that make it too costless to replace (once high) applied tariffs with protection through another instrument can undermine the agreement's commitment value. Furthermore, agreements that constrain tariffs too much may risk pushing import protection into nontariff instruments that may be even more distorting.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
This section turns to the major empirical studies of import protection. It follows a similar organizational structure that first identifies empirical support for the determinants of import tariffs and the role of trade 14 agreements. The analysis then builds from these results in order to assess their implications for alternative instruments of import protection.
Evidence on import tariff formation before and after the signing of trade agreements
The first foundational piece from the empirical literature examines why countries impose tariffs in the absence of international trade agreements. Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence from disaggregated data and export supply elasticities in line with the terms-of-trade theory: governments impose higher import tariffs where they have greater market power. Evidence on the determinants of these optimal tariffs is supported via four different empirical exercises. First is evidence for the applied import tariffs for 15 nonmembers of the WTO. The second and third are evidence from the United States for its 'column 2' tariffs (which apply to countries not granted MFN status) and for measures of its nontariff protection. Fourth is the lack of statistical evidence for the U.S. applied MFN tariff rates. This meets the expectation that U.S. applied tariffs would be statistically unrelated to the theoreticallypredicted optimal tariff because these tariffs have been continually reduced after being subjected to successive GATT/WTO negotiating rounds.
A second set of studies provide evidence that the terms-of-trade theory can help understand the tariff cuts that countries take on under trade agreements like the WTO. Bagwell and Staiger (2011) The main insights from this empirical literature are twofold. First, in the absence of trade agreements, governments impose higher tariffs where they have market power. Second, these and related economic forces affect the negotiation outcomes for WTO member countries and thus implicitly also affect the size of their remaining ('politically optimal') applied MFN import tariffs.
The decline in applied tariffs and the rise in other instruments of nontariff protection
Now armed with a better understanding of the political-economic forces behind the different import tariffs that countries apply in the absence of trade agreements and when they are party to the GATT/WTO, this subsection turns to research on the implications of trade agreements for other instruments of import protection.
The fundamental result that applied import tariff reductions resulting from GATT/WTO negotiations are at least partially responsible for the levels and patterns of nontariff protection is implicit, if not explicit, in much of the rest of the literature. 11 In the influential empirical studies of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) theory of the political-economy of import protection, both Goldberg and Maggi (1999) as well as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) do not use data on applied U.S. import tariff rates.
Instead, they estimate structural determinants of measures of U.S. nontariff protection.
Other approaches attempt to more directly examine implications of the terms-of-trade theory for countries that have taken on MFN tariff commitments under the WTO and which must then use alternative policy instruments to increase their levels of import protection. For example, Bown and 11 Much of the research described here was also informed by Trefler's (1993) Another interesting case study is India, which made massive cuts to its applied MFN import tariffs in the 1990s and subsequently became the trading system's heaviest user of the antidumping and safeguards. Bown and Tovar (2011) estimate structural determinants of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) Finally, a number of studies provide cross-country evidence that an important determinant of import protection through 'new' policies such as temporary trade barriers is the commitment that governments take on that limit their access to 'old' instruments of protection. For example, combined evidence from Crowley (2013b, 2013c) for 18 high income and emerging economies over 1989-2010 finds that as more products' applied MFN tariffs push up against the trade agreement constraints of WTO tariff binding commitments, governments implement new import protection by turning to instruments like temporary trade barriers.
Preferential tariff reductions and multilateral tariff reductions
A separate stream of research examines potential interrelationships between a government's preferential tariffs and its MFN tariffs offered under the WTO. These empirical studies have begun to inform understanding on whether and when preferential trade agreements can be 'building blocks' versus 'stumbling blocks' for multilateral cooperation in trade policy (Bhagwati, 1991) . This has been an open empirical question given the conflicting results that arise from the theoretical literature.
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The first major empirical study to examine this question used product-level data from the United
States (Limão, 2006) . It considered the impact of U.S. preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on the multilaterally negotiated MFN tariff cuts that the United States subsequently made under the Uruguay
Round. Evidence suggests a stumbling block effect: i.e., U.S. multilateral tariff reductions were smaller for products imported under its PTAs relative to similar products imported only from PTA nonmembers.
In a follow-up study of the European Union, Karacaovali and Limão (2008) provide related evidence indicating this stumbling block effect is not limited to just the United States and its PTAs. Their evidence indicates the EU reduced its multilateral tariffs on goods not imported under FTAs by almost twice as much as the tariffs imported under its PTAs.
Because the spread of PTAs is so pervasive, there are many opportunities to investigate the extent to which the stumbling block phenomenon extends to other settings. In one important study, Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008) reach the opposite conclusion after examining the experience of ten Latin American countries in the 1990s. For these Latin American countries, the preferential reductions in applied tariffs were, on average, subsequently followed by governments making applied MFN tariff reductions. In this context, Latin American PTAs were found to be a building block to future multilateral tariff liberalization.
Can theory help explain the difference in these results across empirical settings, and whether any particular PTA is likely to hinder or promote subsequent multilateral trade liberalization? 13 Part of the explanation for the stumbling block evidence may be the importance of non-trade objectives particular to the U.S. and EU PTAs. Limão (2007) , for example, provides a theoretical motivation that the U.S. and EU need to maintain preferences with certain partners in order to compensate for their commitments to higher labor and environmental standards and intellectual property rights protection.
Furthermore, Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008) note an important difference arising in the context of the Latin American countries' liberalization episodes. Unlike the U.S. and EU cases, the Latin American PTA negotiations would have resulted in a given product's 'preference margin' -defined as the difference between its applied MFN tariff and its PTA tariff -as being quite large. Large preference margins present the opportunity for substantial economic efficiency costs to arise through trade diversion (Viner, 1950) . One explanation is that Latin American governments were cognizant of this concern and thus minimized the potential negative PTA impact and deliberately reduced preference margins by also cutting their MFN tariffs toward PTA nonmembers.
13 A related question is the extent to which multilateral liberalization affects subsequent efforts at preferential liberalization. On one hand, when focusing on tariffs alone, full multilateral liberalization over tariffs would obviate the need for additional (redundant) preferential tariff reductions. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) argue that impediments to further multilateral liberalization may push members to pursue PTAs instead.
Additional influences on import protection: Retaliation capacity and WTO dispute jurisprudence
Because trade policy is a repeated game played between sovereign states, the expected trading partner reaction to a new import restriction is also likely to endogenously affect how countries implement import protection in the first place. Historical evidence from the Great Depression has long established expectations that retaliation can have important effects; e.g., Irwin (2011) argues that the trading partner retaliation to the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 severely curtailed U.S. exports.
Research on more recently implemented policies shows how the latent threat of meaningful foreign trade retaliation is also likely to affect the channels through which import protection arises ex ante. Blonigen and Bown (2003) use the setting of industry applications for U.S. antidumping to illustrate how the presence of this tailor-made -i.e., product-specific and trading partner-specific -instrument presents opportunities for import protection to be funneled toward certain countries and/or industries that lack the capacity to retaliate. Similarly, Bown (2004) provides cross-country evidence to argue that the incentives inherent in the multilateral system's formal dispute settlement procedures affected government choices of whether to implement protection through GATT-consistent instruments during 1973 GATT-consistent instruments during -1994 Finally, the WTO's dispute settlement system is also likely to influence the instruments of import protection that member governments apply through means other than its ability to authorize retaliation. 20 policymakers with useful guidance for how to actually apply a safeguard in a WTO-consistent manner.
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In a trading system where governments have access to relatively substitutable instruments of import protection, discouraging the use of safeguards in isolation may not lead to less protection overall. While such rulings may help explain the decline in safeguard use, they may also help explain the steady increase in use of antidumping.
NEW APPROACHES
Notwithstanding the additional questions raised by the burgeoning empirical literature on the determinants of use of different trade policy instruments over time, a number of new theoretical and methodological approaches are also worth introducing.
Ossa (2011) has provided an innovative theoretical approach that identifies an international costshifting effect of trade policy that is separate from the terms-of-trade externality found in Staiger (1999, 2002) . The approach starts from a monopolistically competitive market of the 'new trade theory' models which feature shipping costs and two-way trade in similar (but differentiated) products.
One important result is that a beggar-thy-neighbor motive for trade policy intervention can arise from a 'firm-delocation' (or 'profit-shifting') effect, as governments have incentives to attract more of the world's firms to locate locally so as to save on transport costs. Antràs and Staiger (2012) have introduced a new approach out of recognition for the global fragmentation of production, offshoring, and the increasing economic importance of trade in intermediate inputs. 16 They conclude that one change to a simple assumption maintained in most prior economic theory on trade agreements -i.e., prices being determined not from market clearing conditions but due to 15 Goldstein and Martin (2000) offer other examples of ways through which the increased legalization of the WTO system may have unintended consequences for domestic political economy forces and trade liberalization.
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bilateral bargaining between international buyers and sellers -can have profound implications.
Intuitively, an international 'hold-up' problem can arise when relationship-specific investments are required if contracts between buyers and sellers are incomplete. In such instances, because one party (e.g., the buyer or importer) may be able to hold up the other (e.g., the exporter) and renegotiate the terms of their deal after the exporter has made a sunk investment, the seller will not make the jointly efficient level of investment in the first place. The hold-up problem can thus result in volumes of input trade across countries under free trade that are inefficiently low, suggesting an additional, efficiency-enhancing motive for trade policy intervention.
Such approaches have the potential to affect understanding of not only why governments impose tariff protection, but also why they voluntarily sign agreements to constrain tariff protection, and thus the implications of these agreements for alternative instruments of protection.
Before concluding this section, it is also worth highlighting that one of the fundamental questions arising from the disparate empirical research on different instruments of import protection involves the issue of comparability. Any attempt to make comparisons -across countries, industries, and time -is complicated by the variety and complexity of the instruments in use. For example, how does one compare the restrictiveness of the 'protection' inherent in one country -e.g., that may apply low MFN tariffs but which is also frequent user of nontariff protection -against that of a different country -e.g., that has zero nontariff protection but much higher applied MFN tariffs? One important sign of progress in this area is the effort of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) to more accurately aggregate and measure the many different forms of tariff and nontariff protection through application of the theory of trade restrictiveness indices (Anderson and Neary, 2005) .
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the evolving nature of import protection and research on the political-economic and institutional determinants of different instruments in use over time. To conclude, it is worth reconsidering Baldwin's original analogy -that applied tariff reductions are like draining a swamp -in light of this paper's highlighted body of research. Draining the swamp has more than simply revealed the existence of the 'snags and stumps' of nontariff protection. Some of the major instruments of nontariff protection to arise were not even present at the initial draining of some national swamps. Perhaps the GATT/WTO institutional framework helped the seedlings for such instruments blow in from somewhere and take root in new locations. Perhaps the newfound exposure to sunshine, alongside the inevitable rains that followed, also triggered the growth of the new, and stilladapting, forms of nontariff protection. However, it is also possible that draining the tariff swamp may have begun to reveal fundamental limits to feasible international cooperation over import protection. A still open question is whether a multilateral system with fully enforceable, time-invariant, free trade would be possible or even desirable in the long run.
For what outsiders may deride as a swamp, earth scientists refer to more fondly as a wetland. And what the process of swamp draining has also revealed, once its broader contributions to areas such as flood control and biological diversity have come to be accounted for and appreciated, is that such 23 wetlands may play unexpectedly critical roles in sustaining a larger ecosystem than had been previously understood. 
Source: data taken from Bown (2013, Figure 1a ) and Bown (2012) . *EU at the time was the European Economic Community, some EU member states have AD laws that predate 1968. Temporary trade barriers (TTBs) include antidumping, countervailing duties, global safeguards, and China-specific transitional safeguards. NA=not available.
